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Abstract: We propose a method to improve the performance of two entanglement-based
continuous-variable quantum key distribution protocols using noiseless linear amplifiers.
The two entanglement-based schemes consist of an entanglement distribution protocol
with an untrusted source and an entanglement swapping protocol with an untrusted relay.
Simulation results show that the noiseless linear amplifiers can improve the performance of
these two protocols, in terms of maximal transmission distances, when we consider small
amounts of entanglement, as typical in realistic setups.
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1. Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1,2] is the most practical application in the field of quantum
information and enables two distant parties, Alice and Bob, to establish a secret key through
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insecure quantum and classical channels. The continuous-variable version of quantum key distribution
(CV-QKD) [3–5], an alternative to single-photon-based QKD, has attracted much attention in the
past few years [5,6], mainly because it does not require single-photon sources or detectors. The
Gaussian-modulated CV-QKD protocols based on coherent states [7–9] have been experimentally
demonstrated [6,10–12] and have been shown to be secure against arbitrary attacks in the asymptotic [13]
and finite-size regimes [14]. Two-way protocols [15–18] and thermal-state protocols [19–21] have been
also designed.
However, there still exists a gap between the theoretical security analyses and the practical
implementations. Such real-life implementations of CV-QKD systems may contain overlooked
imperfections, which might not have been accounted for in the theoretical security proofs, and may
provide security loopholes. Recently, various attacks have been proposed and closed, such as wavelength
attacks [22–24], calibration attacks [25] and local oscillator fluctuation attacks [26]. One approach to
overcome device imperfections is by characterizing the whole practical system and to consider all of the
existing loopholes. Although some potential loopholes have been discovered and then closed using this
approach, it is difficult to find all of the loopholes in practical CV-QKD systems, because the number of
loopholes is theoretically infinite.
Another approach is by establishing a full device-independent CV-QKD protocol like its
discrete-variable counterpart [27], which is based on the violation of a Bell inequality [28]. Recently,
there has been work to build various device-independent CV-QKD protocols, including schemes which
are both one-sided [29] and fully device independent [30]. The goal of full device-independent QKD is
the removal of the requirement that Alice and Bob need to trust their devices.
In this paper, we consider two kinds of entanglement-based CV-QKD protocols in untrusted
scenarios: an entanglement distribution protocol with an untrusted source and an entanglement swapping
protocol with an untrusted relay. The latter protocol is inspired by [31] and corresponds to the
entanglement-based version of the CV-QKD protocols described in [32–35]. In particular, we consider
a symmetric formulation where the two legitimate partners both modify their data during the classical
data post-processing stage.
To improve the maximal transmission distances of these two schemes, we consider the use of two
noiseless linear amplifiers (NLAs) [36], one at Alice’s side and one at Bob’s side. We show that the
practical example of the CV-QKD protocol with an untrusted source, i.e., the entanglement-in-the-middle
protocol [37], improves by placing two NLAs at the output of the quantum channel at both Alice’s and
Bob’s side. Additionally, the maximal transmission distances of the untrusted relay scheme are also
improved using this same method. Previously, a similar method had only been analysed for the case
of the one-way CV-QKD protocol [38–40]. These improvements are found in the regime of small
entanglement, which is typical in realistic implementations. It is also found that placing only one
NLA at the non-reconciliation side (Alice’s side for reverse reconciliation and Bob’s side for direct
reconciliation) has a greater improvement than placing it at the opposite side.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the two entanglement-based CV-QKD
protocols. In Section 3, we show that we can improve the performance of these protocols by using NLAs.
Our conclusions are drawn in Section 4.
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2. Entanglement-Based CV-QKD Protocols
In this section, we begin by describing the two entanglement-based CV-QKD protocols:
entanglement-based protocols with an untrusted source and entanglement-based protocol with an
untrusted relay, which can also be thought of as entanglement distribution and entanglement swapping
protocols, respectively. We then outline the secret key rates for these protocols in the presence of
collective Gaussian attacks.
2.1. Entanglement Distribution: Entanglement-Based Protocols with an Untrusted Source
The schematic of the entanglement-based CV-QKD protocol with an untrusted source is illustrated in
Figure 1 and can be described as follows:
Step 1: The untrusted third party, Charlie, initially prepares an entangled source. He sends one mode
A1 to Alice through Channel 1 and sends the other mode B1 to Bob through Channel 2, where Eve may
perform her attack.
Step 2: Alice and Bob perform either a homodyne (switching) (Hom) or a heterodyne (no switching)
(Het) measurement on the received modes A2 and B2. Once Alice and Bob have collected a sufficiently
large set of correlated data, they proceed with classical data post-processing, namely error reconciliation
and privacy amplification. The reconciliation can be performed in one of two ways: either direct
reconciliation (DR) [7] or reverse reconciliation (RR) [8].
ܤଶܣଵܣଶ
Hom ܣଶ
ܣ݈݅ܿ݁ BobCharlie
Source
Het ܣଶ
ܤ Hom
ܤ Het
Figure 1. Schematic of the continuous-variable version of quantum key distribution
(CV-QKD) protocols with an untrusted source. Both the entangled Gaussian source and
the quantum channels are fully controlled by Eve. However, Eve has no access to the
apparatuses in Alice’s and Bob’s stations. Alice and Bob can perform either homodyne
(Hom) or heterodyne (Het) detection, using either direct or reverse reconciliation.
Since the untrusted Charlie could be completely controlled by the eavesdropper, the original source
ρ
(n)
A1B1
(where n denotes the number of quantum signals exchanged during the protocol) is not important
to Alice and Bob. What matters is the final state ρ(n)A2B2 before their measurements. Here, we assume that
the final state ρ(n)A2B2 is a ‘collective source’ to simplify the problem, which means Alice and Bob get the
same quantum state ρA2B2 each time, so that ρ
(n)
A2B2
= ρ⊗nA2B2 . The asymptotic secret key rates KDR for
direct reconciliation and KRR for reverse reconciliation are given by [41]:{
KDR = βI (A : B)− χ (A : E)
KRR = βI (A : B)− χ (B : E)
, (1)
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where β ∈ [0, 1] is the reconciliation efficiency, I(A : B) is the classical mutual information between
Alice and Bob, χ(A : E) and χ(B : E) are the Holevo quantities [42]:{
χ (A : E) = S (ρE)−
∑
x p (x)S
(
ρE|x
)
χ (B : E) = S (ρE)−
∑
y p (y)S
(
ρE|y
) , (2)
where S(ρ) is the von Neumann entropy of the quantum state ρ, x and y are Alice’s and Bob’s
measurement results obtained with probability p (x) and p (y), ρE|x and ρE|y are the corresponding state
of Eve’s ancillas and ρE =
∑
x p (x) ρE|x and ρE =
∑
y p (y) ρE|y are Eve’s average states for DRand
RR, respectively. Unless both Alice and Bob performed heterodyne measurements, they first apply a
sifting process, where they compare the chosen measurement quadrature (xˆ or pˆ) and only keep the data
for which the quadratures match. Here, we use x and y to represent Alice’s and Bob’s measurement
results, respectively, for both homodyne and heterodyne measurements.
Note that these secret key rates could be modified to take finite-size effects into consideration. For
simplicity, here we only consider the asymptotic secret key rates, i.e., achieved in the limit of infinite
rounds of the protocol. Firstly, Eve is able to purify the whole system ρA2B2 to maximize her information,
i.e., we have S (ρE) = S (ρA2B2). Secondly, after Alice’s projective measurement resulting in x, the
system ρB2E is pure, so that S (E|x) = S (B2|x) for DR and S (E|y) = S (A2|y) for RR. Thus, χ (A : E)
and χ (B : E) become: {
χ (A : E) = S (ρA2B2)−
∑
x p (x)S
(
ρB2|x
)
χ (B : E) = S (ρA2B2)−
∑
y p (y)S
(
ρA2|y
) . (3)
In practical experiments, we calculate the covariance matrix γA2B2 of correlated variables from
randomly-chosen samples of measurement data. According to the optimality of collective Gaussian
attacks [43,44], we therefore assume that the final state ρA2B2 , shared by Alice and Bob, is Gaussian to
minimize the final secret key rates. If the entangled source is Gaussian, one can show that there exists
a Gaussian channel mapping the initial state to the final state: this means that there exists a Gaussian
attack that is optimal [43? ]. If the entangled source is non-Gaussian, it is an open question whether
the optimal attack is Gaussian or not. However, whether Eve’s attack is Gaussian or not, we can always
bound the information available to Eve by assuming the final state is Gaussian.
Thus, the entropies S(ρA2B2),
∑
x p (x)S
(
ρB2|x
)
and
∑
y p (y)S
(
ρA2|y
)
can be calculated using the
covariance matrices γA2B2 characterizing the state ρA2B2 , γB2|x characterizing the state ρB2|x and γA2|y
characterizing the state ρA2|y. The Holevo quantities become:
χ (A : E) =
2∑
i=1
G
(
λi−1
2
)−G (λ3−1
2
)
χ (B : E) =
2∑
i=1
G
(
λi−1
2
)−G (λ4−1
2
) , (4)
whereG(x) = (x+1) log2(x+1)−x log2 x, λ1,2 are the symplectic eigenvalues of the covariance matrix
γA2B2 and λ3, λ4 are the symplectic eigenvalues of the covariance matrices γB2|x and γA2|y [5].
In particular, a practical example of the CV-QKD protocol with an untrusted source is the
entanglement-in-the-middle protocol [37], in which the source is assumed to be a two-mode squeezed
vacuum state. The latter numerical simulations are also based on this specific example.
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2.2. Entanglement Swapping: Entanglement-Based Protocol with an Untrusted Relay
The schematic of the entanglement-based CV-QKD protocol with an untrusted relay is shown in
Figure 2a. This is inspired by the scheme of [31] and represents a modified entanglement-based version
of the CV-QKD protocols proposed by [32–35]. It can be described as follows:
Step 1: Alice and Bob both generate an Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen (EPR), states EPR1 and EPR2,
respectively, with variances VA and VB and they keep modes A2 and B2 at their respective sides. Then,
they send their other modes A1 and B1 to the untrusted third party (Charlie) through two different
quantum channels with lengths LAC and LBC .
Step 2: Charlie combines the received two modes A′1 and B
′
1 onto a beam splitter (50:50), where we
label output modes of the beam splitter as C and D. Charlie then measures the x-quadrature of mode
C and the p-quadrature of mode D using homodyne detectors and publicly announces the measurement
results xC , pD to Alice and Bob through classical channels. After the measurements of modes C and D,
the two initially independent modes A2 and B2 get entangled if channel noise is not too strong.
Step 3: Bob displaces the mode B2 to B3 by the operation Dˆ (β) and gets ρˆB3 = Dˆ (β) ρˆB2Dˆ
† (β),
where ρˆB represents the density matrix of mode B, β = g (XC + iPD), Dˆ (β) = eβaˆ
†−β∗aˆ (aˆ† and aˆ
are the creation and annihilation operators, respectively), and g represents the gain of the displacement.
Then Bob measures the mode B3 to get the final data {xB, pB} using heterodyne detection. Alice also
measures the mode A2 to get the final data {xA, pA}, again using heterodyne detection.
Step 4: Once Alice and Bob have collected a sufficiently large set of correlated data, they use an
authenticated public channel to do parameter estimation from a randomly-chosen sample of final data
from {xA, pA} and {xB, pB}. Then, Alice and Bob proceed with classical data post-processing to distil
a secret key. The reconciliation can also be done in two ways: either DR or RR.
Note that we can put the displacement operator at each side rather than placing it only at Bob’s side,
which now makes the protocol symmetric (see Figure 2b). This symmetry allows the CV-QKD protocol
with an untrusted relay to have a similar structure with the entanglement-in-the-middle protocol. In this
modified protocol, Alice and Bob displace the modes A2 and B2 by the operators D (α1) and D (α2),
resulting in ρA3 = D (α1) ρA2D
† (α1) and ρB3 = D (α2) ρB2D
† (α2), where α1 = −gA (XC − iPD) /2,
α2 = gB (XC + iPD) /2, and gA, gB represents the gain of the displacements at Alice’s and Bob’s side,
respectively.
Note that these protocols can completely defeat side-channel attacks provided that Alice and Bob
use quantum memories in their private spaces, which is discussed in detail in [31]. From this point of
view, this makes the CV-QKD protocol with an untrusted relay more secure. The secret key rate for
these protocols against a collective attack is similar to Equation (1) and can be found in [32,33] in detail.
See [34] for an unconditional security analysis against the most general coherent attacks.
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Figure 2. (a) Entanglement-based CV-QKD protocol with an untrusted relay where the
displacement operator is placed at Bob’s side. (b) Entanglement-based scheme where the
displacement operator is placed at both Alice’s and Bob’s sides.
3. Improvement Using Noiseless Linear Amplifiers
In this section, we place two noiseless linear amplifiers (NLAs), one at each of Alice’s and Bob’s side,
to improve the performance of the two entanglement-based CV-QKD protocols. We begin by introducing
the NLA.
3.1. Noiseless Linear Amplifier
For Gaussian states, an NLA can, in principle, probabilistically increase the signal-to-noise ratio by
increasing the mean values of the quadratures while keeping their variances at the initial level [38,45–48].
The amplification can be described by an operator Cˆ = gnˆ, where nˆ is the number operator in the Fock
basis. Such an operator maps |α〉 into |gα〉 with a success probability P , i.e.,
Cˆ (|α〉 〈α|) = P |gα〉 〈gα|+ (1− P ) |0〉 〈0| , (5)
where g > 1 is the gain of the amplifier. Only the situations with successful amplification will be used
to distil the final secret keys, while the others are discarded.
In a practical experiment, the covariance matrix before passing through two NLAs takes the form γ,
which is used to calculate the final secret key rates (γA2B2 for the entanglement distribution protocols
(see Figure 1) and γA3B3 for the entanglement swapping protocols (see Figure 2b)). Typically, γ can be
described by the normal form:
γ =
[
a · I2 c · σz
c · σz b · I2
]
, (6)
where In is the n× n identity matrix, and σz = diag (1, -1).
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We then exploit the relationship between the covariance matrix γ and the density matrix ρˆ in the Fock
state basis [39]. The Husimi Q-function of the two-mode state can be described as:
Q (R) =
√
det Γ
pi2
e−R
TΓR, (7)
where R = (xˆA, pˆA, xˆB, pˆB) and Γ = (γ + In)−1. Thus, we can find:
Γ =
[
A · I2 C · σz
C · σz B · I2
]
, (8)
with new parameters A, B and C, after the application of an NLA on each side. In the Fock basis, the
Husimi Q-function is a degenerating function of the density matrix elements. Thus, we can establish a
relationship between elements of the covariance matrix Γ and the elements of the normalized density
matrix σjk,lm = ρjk,lm/ρ00,00 [49]. Then, the matrix Γ after the two NLAs becomes:
ΓNLA =
[ (
g21
(
A− 1
2
)
+ 1
2
) · I2 g1g2C · σz
g1g2C · σz
(
g22
(
B − 1
2
)
+ 1
2
) · I2
]
, (9)
where g1 and g2 are the gains of the NLAs at Alice’s and Bob’s sides (g1 = 1 or g2 = 1 means there is
no NLA). Thus, the covariance matrix γ′ after the NLAs can be obtained by:
γNLA = (ΓNLA)
−1 − I4. (10)
This covariance matrix is used for the calculation of the final key rates in DR and RR, which are
reduced according to the total amplification success probability Ptotal = PAPB|A, where PA is the
success probability of Alice’s NLA and PB|A is the success probability of Bob’s NLA given that Alice’s
amplification succeeded. Furthermore, considering the trade-off between the fidelity and the success
probability of an NLA, a good estimate of the maximal expected success probability for one NLA is
given by [50]:
P =
1
g2N
, (11)
where N is the average photon number of the input state (ensemble) of the NLA. Such an NLA can
amplify an input coherent |α〉 to the target output state |gα〉 with a relatively high fidelity.
3.2. Entanglement-Based Protocol with an Untrusted Source
Using the previous method, we can derive the final covariance matrix γA3B3 to calculate the secret
key rate. As shown in Figure 3, we consider a specific example of an entanglement-based protocol with
an untrusted source: the EPR in the middle scheme [37]. This security analysis and latter numerical
simulations of this scheme are based on the two independent entangling cloner attacks. This is the most
common example of a collective Gaussian attack [51]. Alice and Bob both add an NLA before their
detectors, which here are assumed to be perfect for simplicity [38,45,46].
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Figure 3. Entanglement-in-the-middle protocol. Equivalent channels and squeezing:
an Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen (EPR) state λ sent through two Gaussian channels of
transmittance T1, T2 and excess noise ε1, ε2, followed by two successful noiseless linear
amplifiers (NLAs), has the same final covariance matrix with a state ς sent through two
Gaussian channels of transmittance η1, η2 and excess noise ε
g
1, ε
g
2, without two NLAs.
We can look for equivalent parameters of an EPR state sent through two lossy and noisy Gaussian
channels. The covariance matrix γ′AB (λ, T1, ε1, g1, T2, ε2, g2) of the amplified state with an EPR
parameter λ passing through two channels of transmittance T1, T2, and excess noise ε1, ε2 followed
by two gain efficiencies g1, g2, is equal to the covariance matrix γAB (ς, η1, ε
g
1, g1 = 1, η2, ε
g
2, g2 = 1) of
an equivalent system with an EPR parameter ς , sent through two channels with parameters η1, ε
g
1 and η2,
εg2, without using NLAs. These parameters are given by:
ς = λ
√
[(g21−1)(ε−2)T−2]·[(g22−1)(ε−2)T−2]
[(g21−1)εT−2]·[(g22−1)εT−2]
η1 =
4Tg21
T(g21−1)·[(g21−1)(ε−2)εT−4(ε−1)]+4
εg1 = ε− 12 (g21 − 1) (ε− 2) εT
η2 =
4Tg22
T(g22−1)·[(g22−1)(ε−2)εT−4(ε−1)]+4
εg1 = ε− 12 (g22 − 1) (ε− 2) εT
. (12)
These could be treated as physical parameters of an equivalent system if they satisfy the following
physical constraints: 
0 ≤ ς < 1
0 ≤ η1 ≤ 1, εg1 ≥ 0
0 ≤ η2 ≤ 1, εg2 ≥ 0
(13)
As shown in Equation (12), λ only affects parameter ς , and η1, ε
g
1, η2 and ε
g
2 do not depend on λ.
Thus, the first condition is always satisfied if λ is below a limiting value, given by:
0 ≤ λ <
√
(g21 − 1) εT − 2
(g21 − 1) (ε− 2)T − 2
·
√
(g22 − 1) εT − 2
(g22 − 1) (ε− 2)T − 2
. (14)
The last two conditions are satisfied if the excess noise ε is smaller than two and if the gain of the two
NLAs is smaller than a maximum value, which depends on the channel parameters T and ε:
gmax1 = g
max
2 =
√
ε [T (ε− 2) + 2]− 2√ε [T (ε− 2) + 2]
Tε (ε− 2) . (15)
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Using the previous results, we consider the performance of the CV-QKD protocols with EPR in the
middle by placing two NLAs, one at each output of the quantum channels. We calculate the secret key
rate KDR as a function of distance d under four situations: without NLAs (g1 = 1, g2 = 1), with only an
NLA at Alice’s side (g2 = 1), with only an NLA at Bob’s side (g1 = 1) and with two NLAs at both sides.
The various parameters are chosen from typical experimental values [6]: we choose V = 1.7, β = 0.948
and ε = 0.002 (where the shot noise variance is normalized to one). The transmittance T = 10−ad/10,
where a = 0.2 dB/km is the loss coefficient of the optical fibres and d is the length of the quantum
channel. The total success probability of using two NLAs for the CV-QKD protocols with EPR in the
middle is Ptotal = 1/
(
g2NA1 g
2NB|A
2
)
, where NA = T (V − 1 + ε) + 1, NB|A = T (V ′ − 1 + ε) + 1.
Here, V ′ is the variance of the equivalent EPR when Alice’s amplification succeeds, which is given by
V ′ = (1 + ς2)/(1− ς2) provided g2 = 1.
In our analysis, there are eight protocols that depend on Alice’s and Bob’s measurements (four
possibilities) and reconciliation methods (two possibilities, DR or RR). These eight CV-QKD protocols
can be divided into four groups whose secret key rate and maximal transmission distance are the
same [37]. When we move the entanglement source into Alice’s side, these eight protocols correspond
to the entanglement-based version of the eight primary prepare-and-measure CV-QKD protocols, i.e.,
the protocols where Alice and Bob use homodyne detection corresponding to the protocol of [53]; the
protocols where Alice uses heterodyne detection and Bob uses homodyne detection correspond to the
protocol of [7,8]; the protocols where Alice uses homodyne detection and Bob uses heterodyne detection
correspond to the protocol of [54,55]; the protocols where Alice and Bob use heterodyne detection
correspond to the protocol of. [9].
Our simulation results are shown in Figures 4 and 5. We find that the performance of the CV-QKD
protocols is improved by placing one NLA at each side and choosing the two gain efficiencies as
g1 = g2 = 1.4. The NLAs enhance the maximal transmission of the protocol, in which Alice is
using heterodyne detection and Bob is using homodyne detection with DR, from 17.0 km to 31.6 km.
Furthermore, we also find that if we only put an NLA at either Alice’s or Bob’s side, the performance of
the protocols can also be improved. For instance, placing an NLA at the non-reconciliation side (Alice’s
side for RR protocols and Bob’s side for DR protocols) has a greater improvement than placing it at
the other side. This is because when adding an NLA only at one side (suppose it is on Alice’s side),
according to Equation (12), the covariance matrix after the application of the NLA has the feature that
Alice’s equivalent variance is greater than Bob’s variance. If considering Alice’s part as the reconciliation
part, it is similar to the one-way CV-QKD protocol with DR; while, if considering Bob’s part as the
reconciliation part, it is similar to the one-way CV-QKD protocol with RR. In one-way protocols,
the RR protocol usually has a longer transmission distance than the DR protocol. Therefore, in our
protocols, placing an NLA at the non-reconciliation side is better than placing it at the reconciliation
side. Obviously, the optimal performance of the protocols is achieved by placing two NLAs at each side.
However, if we want to reduce the cost and expense and only have one NLA in the deployment, we need
to place it at the correct side to have the greatest improvement.
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Figure 4. Improvement of the CV-QKD protocols with entanglement-in-the-middle. A
comparison among the secret key rates for the protocols where (left panel) Alice uses
homodyne detection and Bob uses homodyne detection and DR(equivalent to Alice using
homodyne detection and Bob using homodyne detection and RR); and (right panel) Alice
uses heterodyne detection and Bob uses homodyne detection and DR (equivalent to Alice
using homodyne detection and Bob using heterodyne detection and RR), under the following
situations: no NLAs (g1 = 1, g2 = 1), using an NLA at Alice’s side (g2 = 1), using an
NLA at Bob’s side (g1 = 1) and using two NLAs at both sides. Here, we use the realistic
parameters: V = 1.7, β = 0.948, ε = 0.002 and Ptotal = 1/
(
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Figure 5. Improvement of the CV-QKD protocols with entanglement-in-the-middle. A
comparison among the secret key rates for the protocols where (left panel) Alice uses
homodyne detection and Bob uses heterodyne detection and DR (equivalent to Alice using
heterodyne detection and Bob using homodyne detection and RR); and (right panel) Alice
uses heterodyne detection and Bob uses heterodyne detection and DR (equivalent to Alice
using heterodyne detection and Bob using heterodyne detection and RR), under the following
situations: no NLAs (g1 = 1, g2 = 1), using an NLA at Alice’s side (g2 = 1), using an
NLA at Bob’s side (g1 = 1) and using two NLAs at both sides. Here, we use the realistic
parameters: V = 1.7, β = 0.948, ε = 0.002 and Ptotal = 1/
(
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)
.
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Furthermore, as proven in [39,40], the physical implementation of the NLA could be replaced by a
suitable data post-processing (Gaussian post-selection) after the measurement, although provided that
certain conditions are met [52]. Thus, in such cases, we would not need to implement the physical
implementation of the NLA, which requires single-photon addition and subtraction, or an auxiliary
source of single photons and multiphoton interference [39,40].
3.3. Entanglement-Based Protocol with an Untrusted Relay
The improvement seen in the previous section can also be employed in the modified CV-QKD
protocol with an untrusted relay. The modified CV-QKD protocol with an untrusted relay is shown
in Figure 6 where we place an NLA at both Alice’s and Bob’s sides. As illustrated in Figure 7a, the
modified entanglement-based protocol can increase the maximal transmission distance when we choose
V = VA = VB = 1.7, β = 0.948, ε = ε1 = ε2 = 0.002, gA =
√
(V 2 − 1)/[2T1 (V + ε) + 2 (1− T1)],
gB =
√
(V 2 − 1)/[2T2 (V + ε) + 2 (1− T2)]. Under these simulation parameters, the modified
entanglement-based protocol in the symmetric case (the distance from Alice to Charlie LAC is equal
to the distance from Bob to Charlie LBC) can successfully distribute secret keys under such conditions.
Then, using the same method as above, we place an NLA at each side to improve its performance; we
find an improvement when we set the two gain efficiencies as g1 = g2 = 1.8. The NLAs enhance the
maximal transmission distance of the protocol from 1.6 km to 5.3 km in the symmetric case.
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Figure 6. Entanglement-based scheme of the modified CV-QKD protocol with an untrusted
relay, where a displacement operator D is placed at both Alice’s and Bob’s sides and the two
NLAs are placed before the measurement devices.
Furthermore, for DR, we also find that when Charlie’s position is close to Alice, the total maximal
transmission distance LAB will increase to a relatively longer distance. Thus, we study the performance
of the asymmetric case where LAC 6= LBC . As illustrated in Figure 7b, the total maximal transmission
distance increases when LAC decreases. In the asymmetric case, the performance of the modified
CV-QKD protocol is also improved by placing two NLAs, one at each side. The maximal total
transmission distance of the modified protocol using two NLAs, with gain efficiencies g1 = g2 = 1.8,
is enhanced from 17.5 km to 25.2 km in the most asymmetric case (i.e., LAC ≈ 0 km). Here ‘0 km’
indicates that the transmission distance from Alice to Charlie is very short but not exactly zero. In
fact, even when Charlie is at Alice’s side, there still exists a distance between Alice’s laser and the
beamsplitter. Therefore, in the numerical simulation although we assume the channel transmittance is
T1 = 1, the excess noise ε1 still exists, and is ε1 = 0.002.
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Note that the sources for Alice and Bob are EPR states. Thus, the protocols can remove side-channel
attacks, as discussed in [31], which makes the CV-QKD protocol with untrusted relay more secure.
Finally, we also find that if we only put an NLA at Alice’s or Bob’s side, the performance of the protocols
can also be improved. This is the same conclusion as before: placing an NLA at the non-reconciliation
side (Alice’s side for RR protocols and Bob’s side for DR protocols) has a greater improvement than
placing it at the other side.
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Figure 7. Improvement of the modified CV-QKD protocol with an untrusted relay in (a) the
symmetric case (i.e., LAC = LBC) and (b) the asymmetric case (i.e., LAC 6= LBC). A
comparison among the secret key rates in DR under the following situations: no NLAs
(g1 = 1, g2 = 1), using an NLA at Alice’s side (g2 = 1), using an NLA at Bob’s side
(g1 = 1) and using two NLAs one at each side. Here, we use the realistic parameters:
VA = VB = 1.7, β = 0.948, ε = 0.002 and Ptotal = 1/
(
g2NA1 g
2NB|A
2
)
.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we have discussed how to improve the performance of two entanglement-based
continuous-variable QKD protocols using noiseless linear amplifiers. The first scheme was an
entanglement distribution protocol: continuous-variable QKD protocols with an untrusted source, where
the entangled source is generated by a third party, but may have actually been created or controlled by
the eavesdropper. The second scheme was an entanglement swapping protocol: entanglement-based
continuous-variable QKD protocol with an untrusted relay.
By inserting two noiseless linear amplifiers, one at each of Alice’s and Bob’s side, simulation results
show that the proposed method can increase the maximal transmission distances of both protocols in the
experimentally-feasible regime of small entanglement, corresponding to small modulation. In fact, in
certain situations, we see a doubling of the allowed secure transmission distances. Furthermore, it is also
found that placing only one NLA at the non-reconciliation side (Alice’s side for reverse reconciliation
protocols and Bob’s side for direct reconciliation protocols) has a greater improvement than placing it at
the other corresponding side.
Future investigations will involve the analysis of the protocols against more general two-mode
Gaussian attacks, which are coherent between the two channels connecting the remote parties with the
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middle source or relay. In fact, as pointed out in [34], the unconditional secret-key rate of the relay-based
protocol must be derived in the presence of such attacks, which may outperform the collective one-mode
Gaussian attacks (based on the use of independent entangling cloners).
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